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ABSTRACT
Mutual fund ﬂows respond signiﬁcantly to the return gap, which captures
information about unobserved actions of mutual funds and predicts future
performance. The sensitivity of fund ﬂows to the return gap is: (i) strong and
positive; (ii) increasing with investor sophistication; (iii) highly nonlinear;
and (iv) decreasing with the informativeness of past fund returns. On aver-
age, the response of investors to the return gap enhances their performance.
Our ﬁndings suggest there is a sophisticated mass of investors who can dis-
tinguish good from bad managers using information that may not be directly
inferred from standard performance indicators.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With currently more than $8.5 trillion in assets under management1, the equity
mutual fund industry holds a substantial amount of the total market portfolio
in the USA. Understanding how investors move capital across the plenitude of
funds available is therefore important for understanding the allocative efﬁ-
ciency of capital markets. The extensive mutual fund literature has studied vari-
ous determinants of mutual fund ﬂows, with the overall conclusion that
investors tend to make naive decisions. Most notably, past studies have shown
that investors make decisions largely based on past performance (e.g., Ippolito
1992; Chevalier and Ellison 1997; Sirri and Tufano 1998), even though past
* We would like to thank Dion Bongaerts, Mathijs Cosemans, Mathijs A. van Dijk, Egemen Genc,
Jiekun Huang, Hao Jiang, Clemens Sialm, Meijun Qian, Buhui Qiu, Darya Yuferova, and seminar
participants at the VU Amsterdam, National University of Singapore Business School, New Economic
School Moscow, the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, and the 2013 FMA
European Conference in Luxembourg, for helpful comments. Part of this project was undertaken
while Teodor Dyakov was a visiting scholar at the National University of Singapore. The ﬁnancial
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performance appears to be a poor predictor of future performance (e.g., Carhart
1997). Recent results from the behavioral literature further point to the direc-
tion that investors often seem to be naive and inexperienced in their
decisions.2
In this paper, we want to augment our knowledge on the drivers behind
mutual fund ﬂows by investigating whether investors direct ﬂows towards man-
agers likely to add value in the future. We argue that investors may possess
information about future performance which is not directly captured by observ-
able fund characteristics. Investors may base their inferences on information
coming from qualitative sources, an analysis of fund holdings, reading analysts’
reports, and so on. As long as the performance signal that investors derive is
not captured by observable fund characteristics, regressing fund ﬂows on fund
characteristics might miss important insights about some of the drivers behind
fund ﬂows.
We use the return gap of Kacperczyk et al. (2008) to proxy such information
about future performance. Kacperczyk et al. (2008) show that the return gap,
calculated as the difference between the reported fund returns and the hypo-
thetical return of the fund’s most recently disclosed holdings, is highly persis-
tent and predicts future performance. The return gap is particularly useful for
avoiding poorly performing funds in the future. In contrast to the return gap,
conventional performance measurements have very limited ability to distin-
guish good from bad fund mangers. Moreover, the return gap cannot be
explained by observable fund characteristics, such as past performance. These
results suggest the existence of information about future performance orthogo-
nal to previously studied observable fund characteristics as determinants of
mutual fund ﬂows.
Accordingly, we investigate whether mutual fund ﬂows are related to infor-
mation about future performance reﬂected in the return gap. A positive correla-
tion between fund ﬂows and past realizations of the return gap would indicate
that mutual fund investors are able to differentiate good from bad managers
using information beyond readily available performance indicators. Such posi-
tive correlation does not require investors to be able to actually calculate the
return gap for each fund. Instead, it suggests that investors use information sig-
nals correlated with the information content of the return gap when investing
in funds.
Using a large panel of nearly 2500 actively managed US equity mutual funds
over the period 1990 to 2010, we ﬁnd strong support for this conjecture. Our
results show a strong sensitivity of fund ﬂows to the return gap, over and above
other performance indicators. More speciﬁcally, a one standard deviation
increase in the return gap during the last year is followed by a 0.74% increase
in money ﬂows in the following quarter. This ﬁnding indicates that mutual
fund investors use information about future performance beyond standard
2 Examples include Barber et al. (2005), Cooper et al. (2005), Choi et al. (2010), Bailey
et al. (2011), and Frazzini and Lamont (2008).
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backward-looking performance measures, like returns and alphas, in their allo-
cation decisions.
Separating bad from good managers is a process that requires a certain
degree of investor sophistication. Consistent with this notion, we ﬁnd that
the sensitivity of fund ﬂows to the return gap is stronger for institutional
investors than for retail investors. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that almost all of
the sensitivity of fund ﬂows is driven by a response to funds in the top
return gap quintile. We also ﬁnd that the sensitivity of fund ﬂows to the
return gap is stronger when there is less cross-sectional dispersion in fund
performance, implying that the performance information investors obtain
becomes more important when there is less information in past net
performance.
We further investigate the economic importance from our main ﬁnding
that fund ﬂows respond to the return gap. Given that the return gap is
related to future performance, the positive sensitivity of fund ﬂows to past
realizations of the return gap suggests that investors enhance their returns
from directing ﬂows towards high return gap funds and avoiding low return
gap funds. To assess the economic magnitude of this effect, we ﬁrst calculate
for each fund the difference between the expected fund ﬂows from a ﬂow-
performance model including the return gap with those from a ﬂow-
performance model excluding the return gap. This difference captures the
differential capital allocated to mutual funds that is attributed to differences
in their return gaps. Next, we sort funds into 10 decile portfolios based on
this difference and investigate their performance over time. The four-factor
alphas of the spreads between the top and bottom portfolios amount
to 18 to 21 bp per month, depending on the speciﬁcation. These effects
imply a sizable economic beneﬁt that investors realize from directing ﬂows
towards high return gap funds and particularly from avoiding low return gap
funds.
We next test whether investors are guided towards better fund managers
by brokers and ﬁnancial advisers. Our results do not offer evidence for this
conjecture. We do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences in the sensitivity of fund
ﬂows to the return gap across investors using ﬁnancial advisers and brokers
and those who do not. For robustness, we show that very little of the sensi-
tivity of fund ﬂows to the return gap can be attributed to readily available
performance indicators and fund characteristics. This evidence supports our
conjecture that investors are able to infer information about future perfor-
mance which may not be directly observable or easily deduced from fund
characteristics.
An alternative explanation for our ﬁndings is related to momentum. A high
return gap may be the result of funds chasing high momentum stocks. Under
this conjecture, funds with high return gaps generate high returns because of
momentum. This is unlikely to be the case. First, we show that funds with high
return gaps outperform funds with low return gaps even after controlling for
exposure to the momentum risk factor. Second, past performance, together
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with a number of other observable characteristics, explains a mere 4% of the
variation of the return gap.
This paper builds on the literature investigating the drivers of mutual fund
ﬂows. A well established ﬁnding in this literature postulates that fund ﬂows
respond strongly to past performance.3 Other determinants of fund ﬂows
examined include fund size (e.g., Sirri and Tufano 1998), fund ratings (e.g., Del
Guercio and Tkac 2008), the presence of a star fund within the family
(e.g., Nanda et al. 2004), media coverage (e.g., Solomon et al. 2014), advertise-
ments (e.g., Jain and Wu 2000), and fees (e.g., Barber et al. 2005), among
others. Sialm et al. (2015) show that plan sponsors’ monitoring of deﬁned con-
tribution plans’ available options leads to relatively more volatile fund ﬂows
that respond stronger to past performance. Berk and van Binsbergen (2016)
and Barber et al. (2016) study the response of fund ﬂows to alternative mea-
sures of performance derived from competing asset pricing models. We differ
from this literature by showing that ﬂows are correlated with information
about future performance beyond readily available backward-looking perfor-
mance indicators. In other words, we show investors are able to extract infor-
mation about future performance which is not captured by observable fund
characteristics.
This paper is also related to the literature investigating managerial skill.
A number of studies document that some fund managers are able to consis-
tently beat their benchmarks.4 We take this analysis one step further and inves-
tigate whether investors are able, in the cross-section, to distinguish good from
bad managers. What separates us from other papers is that we document a new
channel though which investors (particularly institutional) allocate capital:
namely, information beyond readily available performance indicators. This is
important, as previous studies (e.g., Evans and Fahlenbrach 2012) only docu-
ment some evidence of investor sophistication driven by a response to observ-
able characteristics.
Our ﬁndings also offer support to the theoretical literature that reconciles
the stylized facts of mutual fund underperformance, lack of performance persis-
tence, and the performance-ﬂow relationship with the notion that fund inves-
tors are sophisticated. Notably, Berk and Green (2004) show theoretically that
both lack of performance persistence and the ﬂow-performance relationship are
part of a framework where investors learn about managerial skill from past
returns. Similarly, Lynch and Musto (2003), Huang et al. (2007, 2012) incorpo-
rate investor sophistication in models attempting to explain stylized mutual
fund facts. Our paper provides empirical support in favor of investor sophistica-
tion by showing that at least some fund investors can separate good from bad
fund managers.
3 See, for example, the work of Ippolito (1992), Gruber (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997),
and Sirri and Tufano (1998).
4 See, for example, Hendricks et al. (1993), Elton et al. (1996), Cohen et al. (2005), Kacperczyk
et al. (2005), Jiang et al. (2007), Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), Cremers and Petajisto (2007),
and Baker et al. (2010).
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II. DATA SELECTION
This study combines a number of commonly used databases—Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Mutual Fund Database, Thomson Financial/
CDA equity holdings database, and the CRSP monthly stock ﬁles. The CRSP
Mutual Fund Database provides monthly fund net investor returns, total net
assets and annual data on expenses, fees, proportion of assets invested in
common stocks, bonds, cash and other securities, and other fund characteris-
tics. The Thomson Financial/CDA database covers quarterly/semi-annual hold-
ings of mutual funds, as reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) or voluntarily reported by the funds, which we link to the monthly and
daily CRSP stock ﬁles in order to obtain information on holdings’ prices and
returns (adjusting for stock splits and other share adjustments). Both mutual
fund databases are free of survivorship bias and linked via the MFLINKS tool
provided by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). This study focuses on
US domestic actively managed equity mutual funds, for which the data is
most complete and reliable. Thus, we exclude index, balanced, bond, money
market, sector, and international funds, as well as funds that do not invest
primarily in common stocks. Since most actively managed US equity funds
offer different share classes to investors, we sum the net assets over different
share classes and take asset-weighted share class averages of different attributes
such as returns and expense ratios. More details on the merging process and
sample selection is available in Appendix A.
Following standard procedures in the literature, we deﬁne ﬂows for fund
i during quarter t as the return-adjusted difference in total net assets (TNA)
between the start and end date of quarter t, scaled by the fund’s total net assets
at the start of the quarter5:
Flowi, t =
TNAi, t −TNAi, t−1 1 +Returni, t
 
TNAi, t−1
, ð1Þ
where TNA stands for total net assets and Return for net fund return.
The summary statistics are presented in Table 1. In total, the sample covers
2486 equity mutual funds, ranging from 373 in 1990 to 1691 in 2006. Over
time, the median amount of assets has increased from $137 million to $309
million. We also observe a tendency for mutual funds to hold larger numbers of
stocks in more recent times. Generally, the ﬁrst half of our sample period
(before 2000) is characterized by larger mean ﬂows and higher returns than the
second half. We further note that the mean annual expense ratios have
remained about the same throughout the sample period.
5 Consistent with Coval and Stafford (2007), we exclude funds whose information is too differ-
ent between CRSP and CDA 1=1:3 <TNACRSPi,t =TNA
CDA
i,t
 
and funds with too extreme changes
in TNA (−0.5 < ΔTNAi,t/TNAi,t−1 < 2.0).
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III. THE RETURN GAP: SEPARATING GOOD FROM BAD FUND
MANAGERS
Our study investigates whether mutual fund investors are able to identify funds
likely to perform well in the future. We construct a proxy which is likely to be
highly correlated with the information investors use to distinguish good from
bad funds. The proxy we use is the return gap of Kacperczyk et al. (2008), which
is constructed as the difference between the performance of the fund and the
performance of the portfolio based on the fund’s most recently reported hold-
ings. We rely on the return gap because it is known to be persistent and a good
predictor of future fund performance. While the return gap is not directly
observable, it is more easily derived from observable information than, for
example, a measure like Active Share (Cremers and Petajisto 2007), which
requires detailed information about a fund’s benchmark.
A. Construction of the return gap
Following Kacperczyk et al. (2008), for each fund i in quarter t, the return gap is
constructed as
ReturnGapi, t =Returni, t − HoldingsReturni, t −ExpenseRatioi,t
 
: ð2Þ
Table 1 Summary statistics of the sample
No. of
funds
No. of
stocks
Net assets,
$mil
Flow, %
per quarter
Return, %
per quarter
Expense ratio,
% per year
Median Median Mean Mean Mean
1990 373 56 137.19 0.73 −1.18 1.26
1991 420 56 130.83 3.61 8.33 1.27
1992 502 58 142.66 5.17 2.53 1.29
1993 536 63 173.26 5.18 3.73 1.26
1994 678 67 197.58 2.85 −0.11 1.26
1995 809 68 169.89 3.37 6.96 1.25
1996 920 71 185.53 3.94 4.48 1.24
1997 1000 74 222.20 3.61 5.58 1.23
1998 1160 73 229.57 1.99 4.27 1.26
1999 1201 70 233.10 0.62 6.95 1.26
2000 1374 72 272.15 2.87 0.15 1.27
2001 1408 75 276.30 2.66 −1.23 1.29
2002 1517 76 227.60 1.03 −5.39 1.33
2003 1595 75 171.00 2.24 8.25 1.36
2004 1691 81 214.00 1.22 3.12 1.33
2005 1679 78 232.30 1.32 1.86 1.30
2006 1691 78 261.65 0.77 3.13 1.27
2007 1621 77 306.10 −0.15 1.84 1.22
2008 1603 76 320.25 −1.23 −11.01 1.20
2009 1504 76 239.40 0.19 7.63 1.20
2010 1274 82 309.20 −0.43 −2.11 1.14
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For each fund i, HoldingsReturni,t refers to the quarter t return of the portfolio
holdings disclosed at the end of quarter t − 1 and ExpenseRatioi,t is the most
recently available fund expense ratio at the beginning of quarter t. We use the
stockholdings information provided by Thomson Financial in order to identify
each common stock in a fund’s portfolio. These data come from mandatory
reports to the SEC as well as voluntary reports by the mutual funds. After
2004, all funds are required to report their holdings quarterly to the SEC.
Before then, they were required to ﬁle their holdings semiannually, but about
two thirds of the funds already reported quarterly. Even though we select
funds with average percentage of assets invested in common stocks above 80%
and below 105%, funds still have a proportion of their portfolio invested in
other assets. We cannot identify the precise portfolio composition in those
other assets and we proxy their returns with the returns of suitable indices. In
particular, we approximate returns of bonds and preferred stocks with the Bar-
clays Aggregate Bond Index (formerly known as the Lehman Brothers Aggre-
gate Bond Index) and the return of cash and other assets with the Treasury Bill
rate.6 Since a number of funds included in the Thomson Financial/CDA data-
base have long periods of missing data, we require the latest fund holdings
used for calculating the return gap in quarter t to be not older than 6 months
at the beginning of quarter t. The expense ratio used is the most recently
reported as of the end of quarter t and reported no earlier than 2 years before
the end of quarter t, and is calculated as one fourth of the yearly expense ratio.
Throughout the paper, we aggregate the quarterly calculated return gap to a
yearly return gap measure.
B. Interpretation of the return gap
The return gap of Kacperczyk et al. (2008) captures the impact of unobserved
actions of mutual fund managers. Even though funds are subject to extensive
disclosure requirements, most of their actions remain unobserved to investors.
For example, investors do not observe the transaction costs paid by managers,
the timing of their trades, or how many units of each stock they hold between
the quarterly portfolio reports. However, the impact of these unobserved
actions is reﬂected in the net return of the fund, without affecting the hypo-
thetical return of the fund’s most recently disclosed holdings. Consequently,
the difference between the fund’s return and the return of the hypothetical
portfolio, measured by the return gap, captures the value added (or subtracted)
by fund managers via their unobserved actions. On the one hand, value-adding
unobserved trades would increase the return of the fund relative to the return
of the previously disclosed holdings. On the other hand, trading costs and
6 The bond index data come from Datastream and the return of Treasuries comes from Ken-
neth French’s Data Library http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_
library.html.
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commissions and other value-decreasing unobserved actions affect negatively
the return gap.
We provide summary statistics for the return gap and other key variables,
together with their Pearson correlations, in Table 2. The mean return gap is
negative, which implies that, on average, the gains of the unobserved interquar-
terly actions of fund managers do not outweigh the trading costs. This return
gap is characterized with a substantial cross-sectional dispersion. Our yearly
estimate of return gap is lower than that of Kacperczyk et al. (2008): −0.20% per
year versus 0.13% (equally weighted) and −0.12% (value-weighted) in Kacperc-
zyk et al. (2008). There are two potential reasons for this difference. First, our
sample is more recent. Barras et al. (2010), Fama and French (2010), and Lewel-
len (2011), among others, document a decreasing mutual fund performance
over time. Thus, the return gap could also be decreasing over time. Second, Kac-
perczyk et al. (2008) include a small number of index funds in their sample
(4.5% of all funds), while we exclude them. Index funds are likely to have a
return gap that is closer to zero than active funds. Hence, our estimate of the
return gap should be slightly smaller than that of Kacperczyk et al. (2008). We
further note that the return gap is negatively correlated with fund expenses,
which implies that fees, on average, are not compensating for value-enhancing
unobserved actions. Not surprisingly, the return gap is positively correlated
with past returns and alpha because the return gap contributes to both net
returns and alpha, but the correlations are relatively low.
An important driver of the return gap is transaction costs. These costs affect
fund performance negatively, without affecting the return of the previously dis-
closed fund holdings. Thus, funds paying high brokerage fees will typically
have more negative return gaps than their peers. Grinblatt and Titman (1989)
are the ﬁrst to use the difference between fund return and the return of the
most recently disclosed holdings for approximating transaction costs. Later, the
same approximation for inferring transaction costs has been used by Wermers
(2000) and Bollen and Busse (2006).
However, the return gap captures more than the effect of trading costs. The
return gap may reﬂect informational advantages, or optimal timing of trades
Table 2 Summary statistics and Pearson correlations of key variables
Correlation with
Mean StdDev Return Gap Alpha ExpRatio Flow Fund
Return
YearlyReturnGap −0.02 0.05 1.00
Alpha −0.05 0.86 0.22 1.00
ExpRatio 1.27 0.66 −0.12 −0.04 1.00
YearlyFlow 10.73 39.55 0.10 0.13 0.04 1.00
YearlyFundReturn 9.44 22.60 0.17 0.22 −0.02 0.15 1.00
Alpha is estimated using past 12 months of data with the excess return on the market, SMB,
HML, and momentum as risk factors and expressed in monthly value. All other variables are
expressed in yearly values.
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(Kacperczyk et al. 2008). For example, a mutual fund manager may process
news faster than the market and trade before her private information is incor-
porated into prices. Suppose a manager reported her portfolio holdings at the
end of December and then again in the end of March in the following year
(a realistic quarterly disclosure policy). A manager may sell an overvalued
stock in January, before the rest of the market brings the price of the stock
closer to fundamentals in February. In this case, the asset sale positively
affects the return of the fund without affecting the return of the most
recently disclosed holdings, driving upwards the return gap in that quarter.
Using daily fund returns Bollen and Busse (2005) demonstrate that stock
selection and market-timing are short-lived phenomena whose effect on fund
performance disappear within a quarter. Alternatively, a negative return gap
might appear due to, for instance, agency problem within the fund or the
fund family (e.g., Gaspar et al. 2006; Casavecchia and Tiwari 2016). Thus,
information about the future performance of the fund manager is likely to be
reﬂected in the return gap.
To understand how the return gap is different from alpha, consider the case
when there is a shock to a stock in a quarter when the stock is not traded by
the fund manager. In that case, the shock affects equally the most recently dis-
closed holdings and net return of the fund, and therefore does not affect the
return gap. Yet, this shock is reﬂected in the overall risk-adjusted performance.
In the hypothetical fund setup above, a manager may receive a private signal in
February that a stock will experience surprisingly high earnings in April. The
information content of the trade does not affect the return gap in quarter
1, because the net return is not affected until April. Furthermore, the trade does
not affect the return gap in quarter 2, because it is not traded in quarter 1 and
consequently it does not change the net return in quarter 2 relative to the most
recent holdings disclosed at the end of quarter 1.7 This explains why we ﬁnd
the positive but less than perfect correlation between the return gap and alpha
in Table 2.
Moreover, the return gap cannot be explained by observable fund character-
istics. We regress the quarterly return gap on a number of variables, which
might have an economic link to the return gap. Since our results are similar to
those of Kacperczyk et al. (2008) and in the interest of brevity, we skip discus-
sion of the individual relationships between each determinant of the return
gap and leave it to Appendix B, where we summarize the results in Table B1.
Importantly, we ﬁnd that the R2 of the regression is only 4%, which implies
that very little of information contained in the return gap is captured by
observable fund characteristics.
Importantly, Kacperczyk et al. (2008) show that unobserved actions of some
funds can help differentiate good from bad managers. To show this, at the end
7 Empirical evidence on such trading behavior comes from, for example, Baker et al. (2010)
who demonstrate that mutual fund quarterly trades predict next quarter’s unexpected stock
earnings.
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of each quarter we sort funds on their return gaps over the previous 1, 3, and
5 years and then show that these past sorts predict return gaps in the following
quarter. Moreover, we show that information contained in the return gap is not
captured by other performance measures. Speciﬁcally, funds with higher return
gaps outperform funds with lower return gaps, even when we control for net
returns or alpha. The portfolios with highest return gap do not have statistically
positive alphas, while portfolios with the lowest return gap have statistically
negative alphas. Hence, the return gap is particularly useful for avoiding poorly
performing funds. The results, similar to Kacperczyk et al. (2008), are presented
in Appendix B, Tables B2 and B3, respectively. These two tests suggest that if
investors are able to infer information that helps them predict future perfor-
mance, it can be reﬂected in the return gap.
In sum, the return gap measures the unobserved actions of mutual fund
managers and is a persistent indicator of future performance that predicts
returns better than traditional measures of past performance. Moreover, the
information contained in the return gap cannot be captured by observable fund
characteristics. Therefore, even though we do not observe the information pro-
cess that sophisticated investors potentially use to select funds, any information
they possess that is orthogonal to observable fund characteristics and perfor-
mance indicators, can be reﬂected in the return gap. Consequently, investigat-
ing the sensitivity of fund ﬂows to the return gap provides us with a powerful
setup for testing whether investors can identify good and bad funds in the
cross-section of fund managers, using information beyond readily available
characteristics and performance measures.
IV. THE SENSITIVITY OF FUND FLOWS TO THE RETURN GAP
In this section, we investigate the sensitivity of fund ﬂows to the return gap.
We provide a number of empirical ﬁndings consistent with the hypothesis that
investors respond to information that predicts future performance, proxied by
the return gap.
A. Main effect
We regress quarterly fund ﬂows in quarter t on lagged variables, known to inﬂu-
ence investors’ capital allocation decisions, and the yearly return gap. More
speciﬁcally,
Flowi, t +1 = β0Xi, t + ϵt : ð3Þ
The vector of explanatory variables Xi,t includes past net returns and fund
ﬂows, alpha, the most recently available expense ratio, and past return gap. All
variables are calculated using yearly data. The alpha is estimated at the end of
quarter t using monthly data over the preceding 12 months from a four factor
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model, including the excess return of the market, the size factor (SMB), the
value factor (HML), and momentum.8 We include the most recently available
expense ratio because the return gap is calculated using fund’s expenses. This
way, we rule out a mechanical relation between fund ﬂows and the return gap
that may be due to a response to the expense ratio. Morevoer, we include fund
style-ﬁxed effects in each speciﬁcation.9 We estimate the models using pooled
regressions with time-ﬁxed effects and standard errors clustered on the fund
level.10
The results are summarized in Table 3. We add sequentially the different com-
ponents of the return gap in speciﬁcations (1) to (3). The results indicate that
investors respond strongly to both holdings return and the return gap. In speciﬁ-
cations (4) to (6), we add additional control variables, including fund net return,
alpha, and ﬂows. We ﬁnd that ﬂows are persistent and investors strongly chase
past returns and alpha, consistent with previous studies on the ﬂow-performance
relationship, such as Ippolito (1992) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997). Impor-
tantly, the return gap has an incremental power in explaining fund ﬂows in
each speciﬁcation. A one standard deviation increase in the return gap in the
previous year leads to subsequent 0.74% ﬂows in the following quarter. In com-
parison, a one standard deviation increase in yearly alpha results in 1.26% in
additional quarterly ﬂows. The evidence suggests that the impact of the sensitiv-
ity of fund ﬂows to the return gap is therefore economically important.
Previous studies document negative relationship between fund expenses and
fees (e.g., Sirri and Tufano 1998). We ﬁnd a statistically insigniﬁcant relation-
ship between fees and ﬂows, and in an unreported Fama–Macbeth test we even
ﬁnd a statistically positive relationship between ﬂows and fees. Yet, the speciﬁ-
cations include total expense ratio, which contains management fees, adminis-
trative fees, operating costs, 12b-1 fees, and all other costs potentially incurred
by the fund. Barber et al. (2005) argue that investors might be unaware of mag-
nitude of the different components and thus respond to the more salient load
fees, which are not part of the total expense ratio. Alternatively, investors might
respond negatively to operating and management fees, but positively to the
marketing and distribution expenses, known as 12b-1 fees (e.g., Jain and Wu
2000). The positive response to 12b-1 fees could be driven by managers mask-
ing payments to brokers and advisors in the 12b-1 fees and marketing them-
selves as no-load funds in order to attract naive investors (Haslem 2009).
Table B1 in Appendix B demonstrates that observable fund characteristics
explain only 4% in the variation of the return gap. This makes it unlikely that
the effect we document in this section can be attributed to an omitted fund
8 The risk factors are obtained from Kenneth French’s data library: http://mba.tuck.
dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
9 A fund’s style is determined as at most two of the following styles: large, small, value, and
growth. We base our fund style selection on the basis of on the funds’ Lipper objective
codes.
10 We ﬁnd similar results using Fama–Macbeth regressions (Fama and Macbeth 1973) with
Newey–West standard errors. For brevity, we do not report them.
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characteristic. However, for robustness, we investigate this conjecture in
Section B and ﬁnd that the results we present in Table 3 remain largely the
same after controlling for fund characteristics.
B. The sensitivity of fund ﬂows to the return gap, conditional on investor
sophistication
We conjecture that investors’ information about future performance is likely to
be reﬂected in the return gap. However, such information is likely to be costly
to obtain and difﬁcult to process. Thus, we expect our previous results to be
driven by the more sophisticated investors. To empirically test this hypothesis,
we repeat the analysis in Section A, conditional on investor type, where institu-
tional investors are expected to be more sophisticated than retail investors (for
instance, Evans and Fahlenbrach 2012).
Since 1999, the CRSP database reports whether a share class was distributed
to institutional or retail investors, which provides the main identiﬁcation
mechanism in this section. The share class distinction allows us to aggregate
separately ﬂow and return data for the retail and institutional part of a fund.
Consequently, we obtain ﬂow and return data separately for institutional and
retail investors. Note that if a fund does not distribute share classes to institu-
tional (retail) investors it drops out of the institutional (retail) subsample. In
total, the institutional investors subsample has 25,706 fund-period observations
and the retail investor subsample has 49,653 fund-period observations, cover-
ing the period 2000 to 2010.
We estimate the restricted and unrestricted ﬂow performance speciﬁcations
in Section A, separately for the institutional and retail subsamples. The depen-
dent variable, the lagged net return, expense ratio, and alpha are calculated sep-
arately for the institutional and retail subsamples, while the lagged ﬂows and
return gap variables are calculated the same way as in the previous analysis,
using information on the whole fund level (i.e., both retail and institutional).
We report results aggregating lagged ﬂow measures on the whole fund level,
but results remain qualitatively the same if we aggregate the ﬂows separately for
the institutional and retail subsamples.
The estimation results covering the period 2000–2010 are summarized in
Table 4. In speciﬁcation (1) we report results for the institutional subsample,
while speciﬁcation (2) relates to the retail subsample. Comparing the results
across the two subsamples, we do not observe a differential response to past
performance data. The main difference comes with respect to the expense ratio
variable—institutions avoid funds with high expenses, while individual inves-
tors prefer them, possibly due to the effect of advertisement fees (Jain and Wu
2000; Barber et al. 2005).
The ﬁndings further suggest that the results in Table 3 presented earlier are
mainly driven by the more sophisticated clientèle. Institutional ﬂows respond
very strongly to the yearly return gap. On the other hand, the statistical signiﬁ-
cance using the subset of retail investors is much weaker. Furthermore, the
© 2018 The Authors. International Review of Finance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd on
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magnitude of the estimated return gap coefﬁcient using the subset of institu-
tional investors is larger that the one using the subset of retail investors. The
last two columns of Table 4 compare the estimated return gap coefﬁcients
between institutional and retail investors. Overall, the results are consistent
with the notion that the more sophisticated investors are more able to separate
good from bad managers than the less sophisticated investors.
C. Asymmetric sensitivity of fund ﬂows to the return gap
A large number of empirical papers document that investors reward highly suc-
cessful funds, but they tend not to withdraw money from poorly performing
funds (e.g., Ippolito 1992; Chevalier and Ellison 1997; Sirri and Tufano 1998).
These ﬁndings raise the possibility that the sensitivity of fund ﬂows to the
return gap might be driven by the investors’ ﬂows to funds with high return
gap. Below we investigate this conjecture.
In order to test for potential nonlinearities in the sensitivity of fund ﬂows to
the return gap, we follow Sirri and Tufano (1998) and employ a piece-wise
Table 4 Investors’ response to the return gap—institutional versus retail investors
Institutional Retal Difference in RG
(1) Flowt (2) Flowt (1) − (2)
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Diff t-stat
Intercept 0.03*** 4.48 0.00 −0.49
ExpRatiot − 1 −0.18
* −1.90 0.00 0.01
YearlyFlowt − 1 0.01
*** 7.82 0.01** 2.16
YearlyFundReturnt − 1 0.20
*** 9.45 0.26*** 9.91
Alphat − 1 2.54
*** 8.06 2.28*** 10.24
YearlyReturnGapt − 1 0.14
*** 2.69 0.08* 1.76 0.05 0.80
Style FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
R2 0.04 0.11
Observations 25,706 49,653
Time period Q1.2000–Q3.2010 Q1.2000–Q3.2010
We use the identiﬁcation of retail and institutional share classes introduced by CRSP at the
end of 1999 and aggregate the ﬂow, expenses, and return data separately for the retail and
institutional part of a fund. The dependent variable in speciﬁcation (1) is institutional ﬂow
in quarter t, and in speciﬁcation (2) is retail ﬂow in quarter t. In each speciﬁcation we include
an intercept, the most recently available expense ratio, lagged yearly ﬂow, lagged yearly fund
net return, speciﬁc to institutional (speciﬁcation (1)) or retail (speciﬁcation (2)) investors,
alpha (estimated using past 1 year of monthly fund returns to institutional (speciﬁcation (1))
or retail (speciﬁcation (2)) investors and the excess return on the market, SMB, HML, and
momentum as risk factors), and lagged yearly return gap. All speciﬁcations include style
ﬁxed effects. In the last two columns, we compare the estimated return gap coefﬁcient in
speciﬁcations (1) and (2) and report the corresponding t-stats. We estimate the models using
a panel regression approach where we include time-ﬁxed effects and cluster standard errors
on the fund level. *, **, and *** denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical signiﬁcance,
respectively.
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linear approach. First, we calculate each fund’s fractional rank RG_Rankt which
represents the fund’s yearly return gap percentile relative to the rest of the
funds in that period and ranges from 0 to 1. Then, we spread each fund’s
RG_Rankt over ﬁve different quintiles in the following way:
RG_Q1= min 0:2,RG_Ranktð Þ
RG_Q2= min 0:2,RG_Rankt −RG_Q1ð Þ
RG_Q3= min 0:2,RG_Rankt −RG_Q1−RG_Q2ð Þ
RG_Q4= min 0:2,RG_Rankt −RG_Q1−RG_Q2−RG_Q3ð Þ
RG_Q5=RG_Rankt −RG_Q1−RG_Q2−RG_Q3−RG_Q4
We also calculate RG_mid, which combines the middle three quintiles:
RG_mid = min 0:6,RG_Rankt −RG_Q1ð Þ
Similarly, we split yearly fund return fractional rank into 5 quintiles
FR_Q1–5 and combine the middle three quintiles in an additional bucket,
FR_mid. Similarly to most of our previous analyses, we include lagged ﬂows,
expense ratio, and alpha in the performance ﬂow relationship. For brevity, we
do not report their estimated coefﬁcients.
The results are summarized in Table 5. In speciﬁcations (1) and (2), we offer
results for the whole sample. The sensitivity of ﬂows to past return gap appears
to be very strong for funds with high return gaps. An increase in return gap
among funds in the top return gap quintile (say from 80th to 90th percentile)
is associated with signiﬁcantly greater inﬂows in the following quarter (1.60%).
To understand the economic importance of the ﬁndings, one has to multiply a
given change in return gap percentile rank (scaled between 0 and 1) with the
estimated return gap coefﬁcient pertaining to funds in that return gap quintile.
Importantly, investors appear to not respond to funds with particularly poor
and even average return gaps.
In the rests of the speciﬁcations, we investigate the asymmetries in ﬂows’
sensitivity to the return gap, separately for institutional and retail investors. We
ﬁnd similar patterns as in the previous speciﬁcations. Both retail and institu-
tional investors are characterized with a nonlinear sensitivity of fund ﬂows to
the return gap, over the 2000–2010 period. However, institutional investors
respond stronger to past poor performance and put lower weight on stellar past
performance. Among institutional investors, an increase in return gap among
funds in the return gap quintile (say from 80th to 90th percentile) results in
additional 1.6% ﬂows in the following quarter. Under the same scenario, the
increase in retail ﬂows is expected to be 1.1%.
D. Time-varying sensitivity of fund ﬂows to the return gap
In this paper, we hypothesize that investors can obtain information about
future fund performance, which we proxy with the return gap. Of course,
© 2018 The Authors. International Review of Finance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd on
behalf of International Review of Finance Ltd (IRF)
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investors also take into account more direct performance indicators, such as
past net returns and alpha. Given that the information content embedded in
each of those measures may vary with time, we expect to ﬁnd an increasing
fund ﬂow sensitivity to the return gap when the information embedded in
other performance measures decreases. In other words, in times when standard
performance measures are more informative about future performance, their
relative importance ought to increase.
We use the cross-sectional standard deviation of fund returns to proxy for
the amount of information embedded in fund returns. When the cross-
sectional dispersion of fund returns is relatively low, investors extract less infor-
mation from fund returns to distinguish good from bad managers than in
periods when the dispersion is relatively high. Consequently, when the cross-
sectional dispersion of fund returns is low, investors have to rely relatively more
on other information.11 Empirically, we include the interaction of the lagged
yearly return gap with the standard deviation of fund returns during that year
as an explanatory variable in the ﬂow-performance relationship. We estimate
the model using pooled regressions where we include quarter ﬁxed effects and
cluster the standard errors on the fund level.
The results from this exercise are summarized in Table 6. Consistent with the
hypothesis that the information component captured by the return gap
becomes more important when there is less information in total fund returns,
we ﬁnd the impact of the interactions between the return gap and the standard
deviation of fund returns to be negative. The results suggest that there is sub-
stantial time-variation in the sensitivity of fund ﬂows to the return gap. More-
over, the evidence is in accordance with the hypothesis that the relative
importance of the information proxied by the return gap depends on the infor-
mativeness of other performance measures.
V. DO INVESTORS BENEFIT FROM DIRECTING CAPITAL TO HIGH
RETURN GAP FUNDS?
The results in Section IV provide a number of empirical patterns consistent
with the hypothesis that investors direct capital towards high return gap funds.
This evidence suggests that investors realize positive risk-adjusted returns from
directing capital towards funds likely to outperform and from avoiding funds
likely to exhibit a poor performance.
Therefore, in this section we investigate to what extent investors enhance
their returns by allocating capital towards funds likely to perform well in the
future and withdrawing capital from funds likely to underperform in the future.
To test this, we ﬁrst estimate a ﬂow-performance model using the 1990–2010
11 Similarly to Kacperczyk et al. (2016), we argue that information variables with high disper-
sion contain relatively more information. Important difference between our work and theirs
is that whereas they aim to answer when return dispersion increases, we study investors’
response when dispersion is low versus high.
© 2018 The Authors. International Review of Finance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd on
behalf of International Review of Finance Ltd (IRF)
17
Distinguishing Good from Bad Fund Managers
sample, where the dependent variable is Flowt and on the right hand side there
are lagged alpha, lagged expense ratio, lagged ﬂows, and FR_Q1, FR_mid, and
FR_Q5. We call this the restricted model. For each fund in each quarter, we cal-
culate an expected ﬂow using the estimated coefﬁcients from the restricted
model and the respective realizations of the independent variables. Next, we
estimate a more general model, which expands the restricted speciﬁcation with
three additional explanatory variables—RG_Q1, RG_mid, and RG_Q5, which we
orthogonalize with respect to the variables in the restricted model.
Then, for each fund in each quarter, we calculate the difference between the
expected ﬂow based on the unrestricted model and the expected ﬂow based on
the restricted model. We term this difference “Expected Flow Difference”. At
the end of each quarter, we sort funds in 10 portfolios based on that quarter’s
“Expected Flow Difference” and track their performance over the subsequent
quarter. The top decile contains funds with the highest “Expected Flow Differ-
ence” and the bottom one those with the lowest “Expected Flow Difference”.
This way we obtain a time-series of portfolio returns and evaluate their perfor-
mance using a four-factor model, including the return on the market, SMB,
HML, and momentum. We report results using both equally and ﬂow-weighted
portfolios.
This methodology allows us to evaluate the performance of fund ﬂows that
are due to the information component that we proxy with the return gap. If
Table 6 Investors’ response to the return gap—Time-dimension
(1) Flowt
Coeff t-stat
Intercept −0.01** −1.97
ExpRatiot − 1 0.64
* 1.66
YearlyFlowt − 1 0.00 −1.05
YearlyFundReturnt − 1 0.22
*** 27.08
Alphat − 1 1.48
*** 8.69
YearlyReturnGapt − 1 0.34
*** 5.42
YearlyReturnGapt − 1 × σ(Returnt − 1) −2.66
*** −3.19
Style FE Yes
Time FE Yes
R2 0.08
Observations 85,914
Time period Q1.1990–Q3.2010
The dependent variable is fund ﬂow in quarter t. We include an intercept, the most recently
available expense ratio, lagged yearly ﬂow, lagged yearly fund net return, alpha (estimated using
past 1 year of monthly fund returns and the excess return on the market, SMB, HML, and
momentum as risk factors), lagged yearly return gap, and the interaction between the lagged
yearly return gap and the standard deviation of fund returns during the same period. All speciﬁ-
cations include style ﬁxed effects. We estimate the model using a panel regression approach
where we include time-ﬁxed effects and cluster standard errors on the fund level. *, **, and ***
denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical signiﬁcance, respectively.
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the “Expected Flow Difference” score for a fund is positive (negative), investors’
response to the return gap has increased (decreased) the assets under manage-
ment for that particular fund. Consequently, the difference in subsequent risk-
adjusted performance between funds with positive and negative “Expected
Flow Difference” captures the extent to which investor returns are enhanced by
allocating capital towards high return gap funds and withdrawing capital from
funds with low return gap.
The results, using the whole set of funds over 1990–2010, are summarized in
panel A of Table 7. The excess return on each of the spread portfolios is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels, irrespective of the estimation
method and the weighting scheme. The four-factor monthly alpha of the
spread portfolio is economically important, ranging between 0.18% and 0.21%
per month, depending on the speciﬁcation. The Spearman rank correlation
between the portfolio rank and the calculated ﬂows rejects the null of no rela-
tionship, indicating that despite the small differences between portfolios, the
patterns are monotonic. Overall, the results suggest that investors realize non-
negligible gains from directing capital towards funds with high return gaps and
more importantly, from avoiding funds with low return gaps.12
The results are also consistent with the hypothetical return of a trading strat-
egy, documented by Kacperczyk et al. (2008). They sort funds in 10 deciles
based on their average monthly return gap during the past 12 months, and
examine their subsequent results. Their results indicate that a strategy long in
the top decile and short in the bottom decile generates a subsequent four factor
alpha of 0.22% per month, consistent with the 0.21% we ﬁnd.
In panels B and C of Table 7 we repeat the exercise in panel A, using the sub-
sets of institutional and retail investors (and necessarily restricting the sample
to the most recent decade). The only difference with respect to the exercise
using all funds is that we estimate separately the restricted and unrestricted
models for each subgroup of funds, on the basis of which we construct the
expected ﬂow measures. Even though there is a similar pattern of increasing
performance from bottom to top deciles, the spread portfolios for both institu-
tional and retail investors are generally not statistically different from zero. We
attribute this to the lower statistical power of the test since the analysis of the
institutional and retail subsamples is based on 10 years of data only.
VI. ADDITIONAL TESTS
In this part of the paper, we conduct a number additional test which aims at
providing a clearer understanding of the drivers of the documented fund ﬂows
sensitivity to the return gap. We ﬁrst test whether investors are guided towards
funds with expected positive future performance by ﬁnancial advisers and
12 The ﬁnding that investors enhance their returns through their response to the information
captured by the return gap does not necessarily imply that their overall allocation is “smart”
in the sense of Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999).
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brokers. Next, we show that information contained in the return gap is not cap-
tured by observable fund characteristics. Next, we incorporate the accuracy of
the return gap in our analysis. If investors respond to information signals for
which the return gap is a noisy measure, we expect the responsiveness of
money ﬂows to the return gap to be stronger if the return gap is more accu-
rately estimated. Finally, we examine the robustness of our ﬁndings to a model
speciﬁcation using quarterly measured control variables.
A. The role of ﬁnancial advisors and brokers
The empirical results in the previous sections suggest that investors can distin-
guish between value-adding and value-destroying funds. A potential explana-
tion to this ﬁnding is that investors are directed towards good fund managers
by ﬁnancial advisers and brokers (e.g., Bergstresser et al. 2009; Del Guercio
et al. 2010). To test for this conjecture, we check if the previously documented
sensitivity of fund ﬂows to the return gap is driven by investors who use ﬁnan-
cial advisers and brokers.
We split the data sample in two subsamples—load and no-load funds. We
deﬁne a load fund share class as a share class with a front-load or a back-end
load or with 12b-1 fees above 25 basis points. Information on load fees is avail-
able in the CRSP database since 1999. Similarly to the split of institutional ver-
sus retail investors in Section B, we aggregate fund information separately for
the load and no-load part of a fund and obtain separate ﬂow and return data
for investors using the services of brokers and ﬁnancial advisers and those who
do not. This allows us to separately estimate the ﬂow-performance relationship
for two subsamples—one for the subset of investors using the services of bro-
kers and ﬁnancial advisers, and one for the subset of investors who do not use
such services.
If the ﬂows’ sensitivity to the return gap documented previously is entirely
driven by the advise of brokers and ﬁnancial advisors, we should observe no
sensitivity to the return gap in the no-load subsample. The results in Table 8
suggest that this is not the case and are in line with studies ﬁnding that there
are limits to advice by professional investors (e.g., Bodnaruk and Simonov
2015). Investors in no-load funds respond very strongly to the lagged return
gap measures where almost all of the coefﬁcients are larger in magnitude than
those in the load sample. This indicates that the sensitivity of fund ﬂows to the
return gap cannot be explained by the help investors receive by ﬁnancial advi-
sors and brokers.
B. The return gap and observable information
Table B1 demonstrates that very little in the variation of the return gap can be
explained by observable fund characteristics. However, for robustness, we
include the determinants of the return gap in the ﬂow-performance relation-
ship and check if any of these variables drives the main effects. As an additional
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control, we add a variable indicating whether a fund is a “star fund”. To con-
struct this varibale, we collect data on Morningstar’s star ratings. Previous
research has documented that funds that experience an increase in their star
ratings during the last year receive signiﬁcantly higher inﬂows from investors
(Del Guercio and Tkac 2008; Nanda et al. 2004). Therefore, in speciﬁcations
(1) of Table 9, we include a dummy for an increase in a fund’s star rating by
Morningstar following Del Guercio and Tkac (2008). Results indicate that the
return gap signiﬁcantly predicts ﬂows, even after including the star dummy
variable.
Barber et al. (2005) show that marketing expenses are important determi-
nants of fund ﬂows. They propose front-load and 12b-1 fees as proxies for mar-
keting expenses—the former is related to distribution payments to brokers and
the latter captures advertising expenditure. In speciﬁcation (2), we ﬁnd results
consistent with Barber et al. (2005)—fund ﬂows are negatively related to front-
load charges and positively to 12b-1 fees. Thus, as Barber et al. (2005) argue,
investors respond negatively to the salient front-load charges but marketing
Table 8 Investors’ response to the return gap—load versus no-load funds
Load No-load
(1) Flowt (2) Flowt
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat
Intercept 0.00 0.22 0.02*** 3.63
ExpRatiot − 1 0.80
*** 2.89 −0.01 −0.02
YearlyFlowt − 1 0.01
** 2.13 0.01 1.38
YearlyFundReturnt − 1 0.06
*** 6.32 0.05*** 8.67
Alphat − 1 2.29
*** 11.17 3.31*** 11.74
YearlyReturnGapt − 1 0.24
*** 6.92 0.15*** 4.76
Style FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
R2 0.07 0.04
Observations 54,955 42,731
Time period Q1.2000–Q3.2010 Q1.2000–Q3.2010
We deﬁne load share classes as share classes having front-end or rear-end load (CRSP reports this
information from the end of 1999) or with a 12b-1 fee that is higher than 0.25% per year. Conse-
quently, we aggregate the ﬂow, expenses, and return data separately for the load and no-load
part of a fund. The dependent variable in speciﬁcation (1) is load ﬂow in quarter t, and in speciﬁ-
cations (2) is no-load ﬂow in quarter t. In each speciﬁcation we include an intercept, alpha (esti-
mated using past 1 year of monthly fund returns to load (speciﬁcation (1)) or no-load
(speciﬁcation (3)) investors and the excess return on the market, SMB, HML, and momentum as
risk factors), the most recently available expense ratio, speciﬁc to load (speciﬁcation (1)) or no-
load (speciﬁcation (3)) investors, lagged yearly fund ﬂow, and lagged yearly fund return, speciﬁc
to load (speciﬁcation (1)) or no-load (speciﬁcations (2)) investors. Both speciﬁcations also include
lagged yearly return gap, calculated according to the procedure described in Section II. All speciﬁ-
cations include style ﬁxed effects. We estimate the models using a panel regression approach
where we include time-ﬁxed effects and cluster standard errors on the fund level. *, **, and ***
denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical signiﬁcance, respectively.
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expenses bring more money under management. To shed more light on the
advertising channel, we further interact the two marketing expense variables
with past performance and the star dummy variable. Importantly, even after
including the new variables, the return gap remains a statistically signiﬁcant
predictor of fund ﬂows. In speciﬁcations (3) to (11), we examine the separate
effect of each of the determinants of the return gap in conjunction with the
return gap. We document very small changes in the return gap coefﬁcient, indi-
cating that none of the controls single-handedly subsumes the effect of the
return gap. In speciﬁcation (12), we include all of the ﬂow drivers on the right
hand side. Again, the return gap coefﬁcient remains signiﬁcant. In sum, the
results in Table 9 suggest that observable fund characteristics cannot explain
the sensitivity of fund ﬂows to the return gap.
C. Precision of the return gap
Our main results in Table 3 show that the sensitivity of fund ﬂows to the return
gap is positive. However, some of the calculated return gaps might be noisy
indicators of future performance. For example, managers may manipulate their
reported holdings in order to present themselves as more able. The managers
may window dress their portfolios, which refers to buying (selling) stocks with
past positive (negative) performance shortly before reporting the holdings to
the public in order to convey stock-picking skills. Portfolio pumping, referring
to buying shares in the stocks the fund already owns on the last day of the
reporting period, is another practice used by some managers to inﬂate their per-
formance.13 Both practices would add noise to the return gap as an indicator
for future performance.
Another reason why there might be noise in the return gaps we estimate
comes from the data limitations of our sample. Although small, the share of
non-equity holdings in the portfolios of the mutual funds in our sample is non-
zero. The quarterly snapshots of the funds’ portfolios do not include their non-
equity holdings. Consequently, to calculate the quarterly return of the portfolio
of fund holdings we assume that the fund’s yearly asset class allocation pro-
vided by CRSP is constant over time. However, funds may decide to actively
manage their asset class allocations and have, for example, lower cash holdings
in some quarters, while having higher cash holdings in other quarters. This, in
turn, would add noise to the return gap measures we calculate.
Consequently, if investors base their capital allocation decisions on informa-
tion about future performance which is correlated with the return gap, one
would expect that the sensitivity of fund ﬂows is weaker if the precision of the
return gap is lower. To investigate this, we ﬁrst calculate monthly return gaps
in the 12 previous months. Next, we construct two additional return gap vari-
ables: t-statistic (RG_t) and standard deviation (RG_stdev). In speciﬁcation (1) of
13 Window dressing and portfolio pumping, for example, see Lakonishok et al. (1991), Musto
(1999), Carhart et al. (2002), and Agarwal et al. (2014).
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Table 10, we ﬁnd that fund ﬂows respond positively to RG_t. Thus, the more
precise the return gap, the higher the inﬂows. In speciﬁcation (2), we include
the return gap, RG_stdev, and the interaction between the two. We ﬁnd nega-
tive coefﬁcients on the interactions of the return gap with its standard devia-
tion, implying that investors allocate more capital towards funds with more
precise return gaps. Overall, the results suggest that a more precisely estimated
return gap results in higher fund ﬂows.
D. Robustness tests
Our main test is based on results using yearly estimated return gap, alpha, fund
return, alpha, and ﬂows as control variables. In Table 11, we investigate the sen-
sitivity of fund ﬂows to the return gap, where the key independent variables are
measured on quarterly frequency. Results remain: fund ﬂows respond strongly
to the return gap, even when variables are measured on quarterly level. In
Table 10 The precision of the return gap
(1) Flowt (2) Flowt
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat
Intercept −0.01*** −2.60 −0.01* −1.76
ExpRatiot − 1 0.25 1.09 0.37 1.35
YearlyFundReturnt − 1 0.23
*** 23.98 0.22*** 23.64
Alphat − 1 2.61
*** 13.75 2.50*** 16.12
YearlyFlowt − 1 0.01
*** 4.22 0.01*** 4.23
YearlyReturnGapt − 1 0.17
*** 6.15
RG_t 0.06** 2.10
RG_stdev 0.59 1.16
ReturnGapt − 1 × RG_stdev −3.41
*** −2.78
Style FE Yes Yes
R2 0.11 0.11
Observations 85,914 85,914
Time period Q1.1990–Q3.2010 Q1.1990–Q3.2010
The dependent variable in each regression speciﬁcation is fund ﬂow in quarter t. In each speci-
ﬁcation, we include four lagged return gap scores, calculated according to the procedure
described in Section II. In speciﬁcations (1) and (3), we include interactions of the four return
gaps with the t-statistic of the return gap, calculated from monthly return gap scores in the
past 12 months. In speciﬁcations (2) and (4), we include interactions of the four return gaps
with the standard deviation of the monthly return gaps during the past 12 months. In each
speciﬁcation, we include an intercept, alpha (estimated using past 1 year of monthly fund
returns and the excess return on the market, SMB, HML, and momentum as risk factors), the
most recently available expense ratio, four lagged quarterly fund ﬂow measures, and four lagged
fund net return measures. All speciﬁcations include style ﬁxed effects. In speciﬁcations (1) and
(2), we estimate the models using Fama–Macbeth regressions where we report t-statistics based
on Newey–West standard errors with 3 lags. In speciﬁcations (3) and (4), we estimate the
models using a panel regression approach where we include time-ﬁxed effects and cluster stan-
dard errors on the fund level. *, **, and *** denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical signiﬁ-
cance, respectively.
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unreported tests, we further establish that our key results (i) hold for the subset
of fund funds which hold more than 95% of their assets in equities; and (ii) are
robust to the inclusion of fund ﬁxed effects.
VII. CONCLUSION
We conjecture that mutual fund investors possess information about future
performance which is likely to not be reﬂected in fund characteristics and
past performance. We proxy this information with the return gap of Kacperc-
zyk et al. (2008), which is constructed as the difference between the net
return of the fund and the return of the most recently disclosed portfolio
Table 11 Investors’ response to the return gap using quarterly measured variables
(1) Flowt
Coeff t-stat
Intercept −0.01* −1.80
ExpRatiot − 1 0.35 1.31
ReturnGapt − 1 0.12
*** 3.37
ReturnGapt − 2 0.17
*** 5.64
ReturnGapt − 3 0.15
*** 4.40
ReturnGapt − 4 0.13
*** 3.55
FundReturnt − 1 0.32
*** 15.68
FundReturnt − 2 0.14
*** 7.29
FundReturnt − 3 0.16
*** 10.01
FundReturnt − 4 0.10
*** 6.17
Alphat − 1 0.09
*** 5.08
Alphat − 2 0.07
*** 4.60
Alphat − 3 0.06
*** 4.38
Alphat − 4 0.05
*** 3.03
Flowt − 1 0.09
*** 3.40
Flowt − 2 0.06
*** 5.86
Flowt − 3 0.02
*** 2.91
Flowt − 4 0.01
*** 2.64
Style FE Yes
Time FE Yes
R2 0.13
Observations 84,087
Time period Q1.1990–Q3.2010
The dependent variable speciﬁcation is fund ﬂow in quarter t. Control variables include four
lagged quarterly alphas. To calculate an alpha in a given quarter, we ﬁrst estimate factor loadings
on the excess return on the market, SMB, HML, and momentum using the 12 months preceding
the quarter. Then, we use realized fund and risk factor returns together with the estimated alphas
to compute quarterly alpha. We further include four lagged return gaps, the most recently avail-
able expense ratio, four lagged expense ratios and for lagged fund net returns. All speciﬁcations
include style ﬁxed effects. We estimate the model using a panel regression approach where we
include time-ﬁxed effects and cluster standard errors on the fund level. *, **, and *** denotes
10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical signiﬁcance, respectively.
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holdings. Apparently, the return gap captures information that has high pre-
dictive value for future fund performance. Consequently, if fund investors
possess information about future performance, it is likely to be reﬂected in
the return gap.
Our main ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis that investors are able
to distinguish good from bad funds. We ﬁnd a strong sensitivity of fund ﬂows
to the return gap, which increases with investors sophistication. We ﬁnd that
the sensitivity of fund ﬂows of the return gap is highly nonlinear, potentially
due to the costs associated with identifying information about future perfor-
mance, and increases in times when the information content embedded in
other performance measures decreases. In order to assess the economic impor-
tance of investors’ response to the return gap, we analyze the ﬂow component
associated with the sensitivity to the return gap. We document that investors
enhance their returns with about 2% per year, particularly by avoiding funds
likely to destroy value in the future.
This paper contributes to our understanding of investor sophistication
and the drivers of fund ﬂows. Much of the empirical work has focused on
showing that investors are naive and inexperienced in their investment deci-
sions. However, we show that investors posses the ability to separate funds
likely to perform well in the future from those likely to perform poorly,
using information which may not be readily available. Thus, this paper pro-
vides empirical evidence for the empirically contested assumption in most of
the theoretical literature that there is a signiﬁcant degree of investor sophis-
tication.
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Erasmus University Rotterdam
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APPENDIX A
A. Database construction and sample selection
We start by selecting all US open-ended mutual funds from the CRSP mutual
fund database and Thomson Financial/CDA database from January 1990 to
June 2010. To ensure that we cover the universe of domestic diversiﬁed equity
funds, for which the holdings data are most reliable, we select in our sample
only funds with one of the following objective codes, provided by Lipper, Wie-
senberger, and Strategic Insight and available in the CRSP Mutual Fund
Database:
• Lipper: “EI”, “EIEI”, “EMN”, “FLX”, “G”, “GI”, “I”, “LCCE”, “LCGE”,
“LCVE”, “LSE”, “MC”, “MCCE”, “MCGE”, “MCVE”, “MLCE”, “MLGE”,
“MLVE”, “SCCE”, “SCGE”, “SCVE”, “SESE”, “SG”
• Wiesenberger:“SCG”, “AGG”, “G”, “G-S”, “S-G”, “GRO”, “LTG”, “I”, “I-S”,
“IEQ”, “ING”, “GCI”, “G-I”, “G-I-S”, “G-S-I”, “I-G”, “I-G-S”, “I-S-G”, “S-G-I”,
“S-I-G”, “GRI”, “MCG”
• Strategic insight: “SCG”, “GRO”, “AGG”, “ING”, “GRI”, “GMC”
Furthermore, we include funds only if they have one of the following invest-
ment objective codes in the Thomson Financial database: aggressive growth,
growth, growth and income, or unclassiﬁed, thus excluding any international,
bond, asset allocation, precious metal, and sector funds. Then, we drop funds
that hold less than 80% or more than 105% in common stocks, as reported by
CRSP. We also drop index funds by removing funds that contain in their CRSP-
reported fund name the strings “INDEX”, “INDE”, “INDX”, “S&P”, or “MSCI”.
From Thomson Financial database, we remove overlapping report dates and ﬁle
dates caused by fund mergers and name changes. We also delete funds that
hold less than 10 stocks or manage less than $5 million.
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If a fund offers multiple share classes to investors, we aggregate across differ-
ent share classes. For TNA under management, we sum the TNAs of individual
shares. For funds’ age, we select the age of the oldest share class. For the other
fund attributes (expenses, turnovers, etc.), we take the weighted average of the
attributes of the individual share classes, where the weights are the lagged TNAs
of the individual share classes.
We link the two mutual fund databases, using the MFLINKS database pro-
vided by WRDS. More information on how MFLINKS assigns a unique fund
identiﬁer to each fund in the two databases can be found in Wermers (2000).
We check the MFLINKS databases for assigning reports from different Thomson
Financial/CDA funds to the same fund in MFLINKS, and resolve such problems
manually.
APPENDIX B
B. Determinants, persistence, and return predictability of the return gap
We study the determinants of the return gap by regressing the quarterly return
gap on a number of fund characteristics. Each variable is deﬁned below and the
results are summarized in Table B1.
Table B1 The determinants of the return gap
(1) ReturnGapt
Coeff t-stat
Intercept −0.01* −1.81
Trading costst 0.01
** 1.99
Weight of recent IPOst 0.21
*** 10.51
ρ(holding return and net
returns)t − 1
0.04 0.83
ExpRatiot −0.21
** −2.18
Yearly Turnovert 0.00 −1.38
log(fund TNA)t − 1 −0.01 −0.95
log(family TNA)t − 1 0.04
*** 7.90
log(age)t − 1 −0.02
* −1.66
Flowt 0.11
** 2.21
σ(Returnt − 5 to t − 1) 0.04
*** 4.60
R2 0.04
Observations 78,888
Time period Q1.1993–Q3.2010
The dependent variable is return gap in quarter t. The independent variables are described in
Appendix B. Observations with missing data are dropped. We estimate the model using a
panel regression approach where we include time-ﬁxed effects and cluster standard errors on
the fund level. *, **, and *** denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical signiﬁcance,
respectively.
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Trading costst: Trading costs in quarter t are calculated as the product of
funds’ turnover ratio with the relative rank of the average fund dollar holdings
position within the same fund size tertile. The approach follows Edelen
et al. (2013).
Weight of recent IPOst: IPOs stocks in quarter t are deﬁned as stocks whose ini-
tial public offering (IPO) is conducted after the end of quarter t − 1 and before
the end of quarter t. The weight of recent IPOs in quarter t is deﬁned as the per-
centage of the total fund portfolio held in IPO stocks in quarter t, that is the
weight of the total portfolio allocated to stock with an IPO in the last
3 months.
Correlation between holdings return and fund net returnt: At the end of quarter t,
we construct a time series of the performance of the most recently disclosed
fund holdings over the last 12 months and calculate its correlation with the
fund net return.
Expense ratiot: The most recently available fund expense ratio as of quarter t.
Yearly turnovert: The most recently available fund turnover ratio as of quar-
ter t.
Log(fund TNA)t: The natural logarithm of fund total net assets, expressed in
millions of dollars as of quarter t.
Log(family TNA)t: The natural logarithm of the total net assets of the whole
family, expressed in millions of dollars as of quarter t.
Log(age)t: The natural logarithm of fund age, expressed in number of months
since exception as of quarter t.
Standard deviation of fund returns between t − 5 and t – 1: The standard devia-
tion of monthly fund return in the 12 months ending in quarter t − 1.
As expected, we ﬁnd that transaction costs, estimated following Edelen
et al. (2013), have a negative impact on the return gap. This implies that the
interquarterly beneﬁts from trading, on average, cannot offset the trading costs
of mutual funds. The next determinant we investigate is the weight of recent
IPOs. The previous literature has shown that mutual fund families tend to
assign IPOs strategically across the fund family, allocating high weight of recent
IPOs to certain funds in the family (Gaspar et al. 2006; Nanda et al. 2004;
Nimalendran et al. 2007; Reuter 2006). Given that those IPOs tend to be signiﬁ-
cantly underpriced, it is not surprising that we ﬁnd very strong positive relation
between the weight of recent IPOs and the return gap.
Next, we look at the transparency of the funds’ investment strategy, proxied
by the correlation between the funds’ reported holdings with the funds’ net
return. A low correlation might be due to agency problems, such as window
dressing or high turnover. A low correlation might also be the result of realizing
interquarterly informational advantages. The small positive (aleit statistically
insigniﬁcant) coefﬁcient on the correlation variable that we present in Table B1
suggests that the opaqueness of the trading strategy is negatively related to the
return gap. The negative coefﬁcient on the expense ratio suggests that fund
expenses are not a compensation for the value-added of fund managers via their
interquarterly actions. We further ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect of fund turnover on
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the return gap, which suggests that either the effect of fund turnover is cap-
tured in the trading cost proxy, or that the beneﬁts of frequent trading just off-
set the costs of trading frequently.
Similarly to Chen et al. (2004), we ﬁnd that performance is negatively related
to size, but positively related to fund family size. The strong positive relation-
ship to fund family size is probably due to economies of scale associated with
transaction costs and lending fees (Chen et al. 2004). We further document a
positive relationship between contemporaneous ﬂows and the return gap
which is consistent with the “smart money” effect documented by Gruber
(1996) and Zheng (1999). Somewhat surprisingly, we ﬁnd that funds with vola-
tile returns have higher return gaps, though the effect is economically small.
To show that the information captured by return gap is highly persistent, at
the end of each quarter we sort funds on their return gaps over the previous
Table B2 Persistence of the return gap
1 Year 3 Year 5 Year
Mean t-stat Mean t-stat t-stat t-stat
A: Equally weighted
1 (lowest) −0.48*** −5.96 −0.53*** −8.41 −0.55*** −6.83
2 −0.44*** −10.39 −0.44*** −8.57 −0.43*** −8.80
3 −0.37*** −8.89 −0.38*** −9.21 −0.40*** −8.70
4 −0.28*** −8.16 −0.29*** −6.26 −0.32*** −6.23
5 −0.26*** −6.90 −0.22*** −6.66 −0.23*** −5.78
6 −0.13** −1.99 −0.16*** −4.34 −0.20*** −4.67
7 −0.13*** −3.58 −0.13*** −3.10 −0.18*** −3.18
8 −0.08** −2.08 −0.07 −1.41 −0.12** −2.00
9 −0.02 −0.42 −0.07 −0.81 −0.09 −1.42
10 (highest) 0.20** 2.37 0.14* 1.95 0.04 0.47
High–low 0.68*** 7.91 0.67*** 10.44 0.59*** 6.86
B: Value-weighted
1 (lowest) −0.53*** −4.92 −0.63*** −4.24 −0.65*** −5.86
2 −0.39*** −5.02 −0.40*** −4.92 −0.46*** −4.23
3 −0.32*** −4.39 −0.27*** −4.02 −0.36*** −5.12
4 −0.20*** −3.46 −0.16** −2.26 −0.29*** −3.98
5 −0.16*** −3.66 −0.22*** −3.33 −0.15** −2.03
6 −0.10 −1.61 −0.11** −2.38 −0.14** −2.00
7 −0.06 −1.31 −0.11* −1.92 −0.14** −2.01
8 −0.07 −1.32 −0.07 −1.11 −0.03 −0.54
9 0.04 0.86 0.00 0.07 −0.06 −0.92
10 (highest) 0.08 0.95 0.08 1.01 0.01 0.13
High–Low 0.61*** 5.39 0.70*** 4.70 0.66*** 5.63
At the end of each quarter we sort funds in 10 portfolios based on past 1, 3, or 5 year cumulative
return gap. Next, we track the return gap of the portfolios over the next one quarter and repeat
the procedure. This way we obtain a time-series of quarterly return gap scores for each portfolio.
In panel A, we use equal weights to aggregate returns and in panel B we use fund net assets. We
report portfolio means in percentages per quarter with t-statistics based on corresponding stan-
dard error of the mean. *, **, and *** denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical signiﬁcance,
respectively.
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1, 3, and 5 years. We then show that the past sorts predict return gaps in the
following quarter. The results, summarized in Table B2, show that the spread
between the average subsequent return gaps of funds with the highest return
gap and those with the lowest return gaps remains economically substantial
even after 5 years. Using both equal and value-weighting schemes, the return
gaps of the spread portfolios range between 60 and 70 bp per quarter, depend-
ing on the time-frame used for sorting.14 In other words, the information cap-
tured by the return gap tends to be highly persistent.
Table B3 Fund return predictability based on the return gap
Yearly return gap
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q5–Q1
A: Two-way sorts on net return and the return gap
Net return
Q1 Alpha −0.15 −0.19* −0.02 −0.01 0.00 0.15*
t-stat −1.15 −1.90 −0.20 −0.10 0.00 1.67
Q2 Alpha −0.06 −0.07 −0.08 −0.02 0.05 0.11
t-stat −0.86 −1.17 −1.33 −0.33 0.56 1.57
Q3 Alpha −0.08 −0.07* −0.06 −0.03 0.02 0.10*
t-stat −1.60 −1.75 −1.50 −0.75 0.33 1.67
Q4 Alpha −0.14* −0.06 −0.10** −0.08 0.02 0.16***
t-stat −1.75 −1.00 −2.00 −1.60 0.33 2.67
Q5 Alpha −0.14 −0.14 −0.05 −0.05 0.00 0.15*
t-stat −1.08 −1.17 −0.38 −0.42 0.00 1.88
B: Two-way sorts on alpha and the return gap
Alpha
Q1 Alpha −0.41*** −0.22*** −0.18** −0.17** −0.10 0.31***
t-stat −3.15 −2.75 −2.57 −2.13 −0.91 2.82
Q2 Alpha −0.19*** −0.13*** −0.10** −0.05 −0.11 0.09
t-stat −3.17 −2.60 −2.00 −1.00 −1.57 1.50
Q3 Alpha −0.12** −0.07 −0.05 −0.03 0.00 0.11**
t-stat −2.00 −1.40 −1.00 −0.75 0.00 2.20
Q4 Alpha −0.08 −0.06 0.00 −0.02 −0.01 0.06
t-stat −1.14 −1.20 0.00 −0.40 −0.14 1.00
Q5 Alpha −0.01 0.10 0.13 0.19* 0.17 0.17**
t-stat −0.08 1.25 1.44 1.90 1.13 2.13
At the end of each quarter we sort funds in 5 quintiles based on past 1 year net return (panel A)
or past alpha (panel B). Alpha is estimated using past 12 months of data and the excess return
on the market, SMB, HML, and momentum as risk factors. Next, we sort each of the quintiles in
5 quintiles based on past 1 year return gap. We collect the returns of the portfolios over the next
3 months and repeat the procedure. This way we obtain a time-series of quarterly return gap
scores for each portfolio. Next, we evaluate the performance of each time-series of portfolio
returns using a four-factor asset pricing model, where we use the excess return on the market,
SMB, HML, and momentum as risk factors. For each time-series of portfolio returns, we report
the alpha and the corresponding t-statistic. *, **, and *** denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of sta-
tistical signiﬁcance, respectively.
14 The methodology used and the results obtained are very similar to those of Kacperczyk
et al. (2008).
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We further show that the information contained in the return gap is not
already contained in other performance indicators. At the end of each quarter
we double-sort funds on past returns or alpha and the return gap. Next, we col-
lect the returns of the portfolios and rebalance. This way we obtain a time-series
of double-sorted portfolios and examine their performance. Results are summa-
rized in Table B3. In panel A (B), we ﬁrst sort on the fund net return (alpha) in
the previous year, and then on the return gap in the previous year. Going from
left to right in both panels, there is an increasing pattern in abnormal post-
ranking performance. The spreads between the top and bottom quintile of
funds sorted on return gap ranges between 6 and 31 bp per month. This indi-
cates that the return gap contains predictive power about fund performance
which complements the information in past net returns and alpha, rather than
substituting it. The return gap is particularly informative about the future per-
formance of the funds with the best/worst past performance, where the spread
between funds with the highest and lowest realizations of the return gap ranges
between 15 and 31 bp per month and is signiﬁcantly different from zero at con-
ventional levels.
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